

NOT EVERYTHING THAT MOVES MUST CONVERGE

EVIDENCE FROM GLOBAL POLICY AND PRACTICE ON PERFORMANCE-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY

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APPENDIX 1: OVERVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRADITIONS

	Napoleonic	Germanic	Scandinavian	Anglo-American	Confucian
Conception of the State	Indivisible, fighting against centrifugal forces	Corporatist model	Mixture of conceptions, selectively invoked	Contractarian approach	Organic approach, 'executive-led and paternalistic government'
Law vs. management	Legalistic nature of public administration	Legalistic foundations; Rechtsstaat tradition	Mixture of Rechtsstaat and managerial features	Managerial tradition (strengthened by NPM)	Mixed
Uniformity	Centralization and emphasis on on uniformity	Limited levels of uniformity and centralization	Strong commitment to decentralized government	Varying degrees of centralization	Emphasis on uniformity
State and social actors	Absence of strong tradition of non-state actors	Wide range of social actors influencing governance (in decline)	Historical integration of social actors into governance (in decline)	Pluralist tradition	'Pluralist/illegitimate'
Personal/ Career	Clear separation between public employment and the rest of the labor market	Public employees contracted under ordinary labor law	Generally lacking centralized personnel management systems and tenured civil servants	Merit-based, apolitical civil service as the ideal (In decline)	Emphasis on the meritocratic selection of civil servants coexisting with patrimonial links
Politics and administration	Organic linkages, leading to concerns over politicization	More porous boundaries between political and administrative spheres	Clear separation between policy-making and policy implementation (in decline)	Political and bureaucratic roles traditionally seen as incompatible (in decline)	Fused
Accountability	Law as the primary mechanism of control Emphasis on ex ante controls	Emphasis on legalistic and parliamentary forms	Complex systems involving various forms of accountability Rise of performance management (NPM)	Heavy reliance on parliamentary mechanisms Rise of performance-based systems (NPM)	Tradition of accountability through institutions Emphasis on public servants' personal responsibility

Source: Authors' elaboration based on Peters (2021) and Painter & Peters (2010b).

APPENDIX 2: TESTING FOR OVERALL CONVERGENCE

To determine whether there is a trend towards global convergence in performance-based accountability (PBA) practice, we look at some of the most important related indicators, specifically those related to data use. Our results indicate that there is no such thing as a global convergence in relation to any of the policies contemplated in this study – at least regarding their enactment. This is confirmed by the log t test applied in all the indicators considered across the OECD countries, which points out that an overall convergence is not found, at the 5% significant level.

Starting with the frequency of use of standardized tests to assess students, we first observe the relative transition paths of all countries, which are plotted in Figure a1. It suggests, at first glance, that there is a slight reduction in the differences between countries' paths. However, the log t convergence test, which is based on a non-linear dynamic factor that models transitional heterogeneity, indicates that there is no overall cross-country convergence, meaning that between-country differences in the use of standardized tests to assess students have increased over time (Table a1).

Figure a1: Transition paths of countries: frequency of use of standardized tests




Table a1: Global convergence test: frequency of use of standardized tests

log t test:

Variable	Coeff	SE	T-stat
log(t)	-1.3087	0.0234	-55.9490

The number of individuals is 27.
The number of time periods is 4.
The first 1 periods are discarded before regression.

In what concerns the use of achievement data to publicly disseminate the schools' results, we see in the Figure a2 that there is a great heterogeneity among the OECD countries. The hypothesis of cross-country convergence is, in fact, rejected by the data, as the coefficient of the log-t regression is negative and statistically significant (Table a2). It therefore seems that OECD countries, whose transition paths remain highly heterogeneous and show divergent tendencies, are converging, but towards multiple equilibria. The figure also shows similar patterns between transition paths of individual countries, which seem to converge to a common equilibrium, especially at the low levels of the indicator.

Figure a2: Transition paths of countries: achievement data is posted publicly




Table a2: Global convergence test: achievement data are posted publicly

log t test:

Variable	Coeff	SE	T-stat
log(t)	-2.0200	0.0223	-90.5574

The number of individuals is 33.
The number of time periods is 5.
The first 2 periods are discarded before regression.

The third indicator refers to the percentage of schools whose results are tracked by an administrative authority. Figure a3 shows how the transition paths are mostly concentrated in the upper part of the chart. However, the t test applied with this indicator also shows how global convergence across the OECD countries cannot be confirmed. As in the previous case, it is necessary to look deeper into the patterns within groups of countries to determine how convergence is characterized.

Figure a3: Transition paths of countries: achievement data are tracked over time by an administrative authority




Table a3. Global convergence log t test: achievement data are tracked over time by an administrative authority

log t test:

Variable	Coeff	SE	T-stat
log(t)	-2.2267	0.0074	-300.9500

The number of individuals is 33.
The number of time periods is 5.
The first 2 periods are discarded before regression.

Finally, we focus on an indicator that concerns the use of student outcomes to make judgments about teacher effectiveness. Here we reach similar conclusions to those we have pointed out so far. While we observe great heterogeneity between countries in the transition paths regarding the use of test results to assess teaching effectiveness, the t-test to determine convergence indicates the non-existence of a common equilibrium. As in the rest of the cases, it is then necessary to delve deeper into the dynamics of convergence according to groups of countries to confirm whether the administrative and institutional contexts and cultures play a determining role.

Figure a4. Transition paths of countries: tests are used to make judgements on teacher effectiveness




Table a4. Global convergence log t test: tests are used to make judgements on teacher effectiveness

log t test:

Variable	Coeff	SE	T-stat
log(t)	-1.9542	0.1774	-11.0134

The number of individuals is 26.
The number of time periods is 5.
The first 2 periods are discarded before regression.